BRICS Plus Delhi Declaration - From Multilateralism to a New Architecture of Cooperation
By Kirtan Bhana, The Diplomatic Society
The 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi marks an important stage in the evolution of a grouping that has changed considerably since Brazil, Russia, India and China first gave political expression to the BRICS concept. With the subsequent inclusion of South Africa and the more recent expansion across Africa, the Middle East and Asia, BRICS has become considerably more representative of the developing world and of the changing distribution of economic and political influence.
The significance of the New Delhi Declaration lies in the number of countries participating as well as in what the expanded grouping is beginning to represent. BRICS now brings together major producers, consumers, energy suppliers, agricultural economies, manufacturing centres, technology powers and some of the world's most rapidly developing markets.
Its members and partners collectively represent close to half of humanity and around 40 percent of global economic output on a purchasing-power-parity basis. The 2026 summit, with participation extending across BRICS members, partner countries and international organisations, demonstrated the growing breadth of the platform.
India's presidency has placed particular emphasis on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability. These themes are important because the world is confronting a period in which economic interdependence is increasingly accompanied by strategic rivalry, trade fragmentation, technological competition, financial uncertainty and unresolved conflicts. The challenge for BRICS is therefore no longer to just articulate dissatisfaction with an international system that many developing countries regard as insufficiently representative, but the more difficult task of letting go of an outdated, inefficient and unbalanced system, and help construct practical alternatives and complementary institutions capable of producing better outcomes.
The New Delhi Declaration should consequently be read as part of an ongoing transition from a BRICS that was principally discussed as an emerging-market grouping towards a broader platform for economic cooperation, development finance, technological exchange, trade facilitation, institutional reform and potentially, over time, more structured forms of security cooperation.
From geopolitical rivalry to collective responsibility
There is a temptation to interpret BRICS through the familiar language of geopolitical competition, particularly in the context of tensions between Russia and NATO, the war in Ukraine, instability in the Middle East and the continuing contest over the future shape of the international system. Such an interpretation is understandable, but it risks overlooking the more fundamental question confronting the organisation.
The question is whether BRICS can help move international relations away from what might be described as the geopolitics of politicians, by politicians and for politicians, towards a more people-centred conception of international governance.
International politics is ultimately justified by its consequences for ordinary people. Economic diplomacy must translate into employment and opportunity. Trade agreements must create markets for producers. Infrastructure must connect communities and businesses. Financial reform must make development finance more accessible. Technology must expand human capability rather than deepen exclusion. Security must protect people and the systems on which their livelihoods depend.
In this sense, BRICS has an opportunity to give practical meaning to multilateralism. Its greater contribution could be to support a world in which several centres of economic and political influence coexist, cooperate and compete within a more balanced international system.
A more multipolar world should not reproduce the politics of confrontation with a different collection of countries at the centre. Multipolarity becomes meaningful when it creates greater choice, representation and agency for countries and societies that have historically had limited influence over the rules governing international finance, trade, technology and development.
India's approach has been particularly significant in this regard. Its strategic autonomy, relationships with the United States, Europe, Russia, China and countries of the Global South, together with its participation in BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BIMSTEC, IORA and the G20, place New Delhi in a distinctive position to engage across different centres of power.
From summit diplomacy to economic architecture
The most consequential development around the New Delhi summit may ultimately be economic rather than political.
The BRICS Business Forum, convened immediately before the leaders' summit, brought business leaders, policymakers and government representatives into the broader BRICS conversation. A new economic reality cannot be created through government declarations alone. Businesses must trade, investors must invest, banks must finance, entrepreneurs must innovate and logistics networks must move goods. It is about building an ecosystem that makes economic interaction more fair, trustworthy, transparent, beneficial and humane as it is after all people that make up the markets. They are the developers, innovators, builders and consumers of products, services, finance, currency, logistic and infrastructure.
This includes the New Development Bank, greater use of national currencies, more efficient cross-border payment mechanisms, financial technology, digital infrastructure, investment platforms, infrastructure development, connectivity and the mobilisation of private capital. BRICS finance discussions have also continued to emphasise more accessible, faster and safer cross-border payments and greater use of local currencies.
The New Delhi Declaration is significant because it does not attempt to impose an immediate common currency. Instead, it concentrates on practical financial cooperation, including national-currency settlements, payment interoperability and strengthening the ability of financial institutions to support cross-border commerce.
The future of international finance is unlikely to be determined by a simple binary choice between the US dollar and a new BRICS currency. The more consequential question is whether international commerce will increasingly have more than one viable financial pathway.
If Brazilian exporters, Indian manufacturers, Chinese investors, African producers, Russian energy companies, Middle Eastern financiers and Southeast Asian businesses can increasingly settle portions of their transactions through national currencies, interoperable payment systems and other mechanisms, they may reduce the costs and vulnerabilities associated with excessive dependence upon a single financial channel.
This does not mean that the dollar is about to disappear, nor that BRICS has created a substitute for the existing international monetary system. It means that a more diversified financial environment is emerging in which countries have greater choice, more practical and potentially more durable form of financial resilience when conducting commerce.
The New Development Bank and a different development trajectory
The New Development Bank provides another important component of this emerging architecture. The NDB was established because developing economies have long argued that their infrastructure and development requirements cannot be adequately addressed through existing international financial institutions alone. Its purpose is not to replace the World Bank or other multilateral development banks, but to provide an additional institutional source of finance and another perspective on development.
Its future importance could grow considerably if it expands local-currency financing, mobilises private capital and supports infrastructure and sustainable development projects across BRICS and the wider Global South.
Africa's development challenge is not a shortage of natural resources, it is the shortage of infrastructure, processing capacity, affordable finance, reliable energy, efficient transport systems, technology and market connectivity required to convert those resources into higher-value economic activity.
The strategic question is whether BRICS can contribute to a transition from an Africa that predominantly exports commodities to an Africa that increasingly participates in manufacturing, processing, technology, logistics, financial services and knowledge-based industries. This would mean supporting African value addition rather than simply facilitating the export of African raw materials. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and Agenda 2063 provides an important platform to turn continental market integration from an institutional ambition into a tangible commercial reality.
Fintech and the digital foundations of the new economy
Finance is also changing because the infrastructure of finance is changing.
Digital public infrastructure, fintech, artificial intelligence, digital identity, mobile payments and increasingly sophisticated financial technologies are transforming how citizens and businesses interact with banks, governments and markets.
India has demonstrated the scale at which digital public infrastructure can support financial inclusion and economic participation, and BRICS cooperation is increasingly examining the possibilities for sharing experience in digital systems and emerging technologies with implications that extend beyond banking.
A farmer who can receive digital payments, a small enterprise that can access cross-border markets, a manufacturer that can track goods digitally, a student who can participate in online education and a patient who can access digital health services are all participants in a changing economic system.
The emerging BRICS agenda around artificial intelligence, fintech, digital public infrastructure, cybersecurity and technology therefore also raises a broader development question: who will have access to the technologies that define the next economy.
If access remains concentrated among the largest corporations and wealthiest countries, technological progress could deepen existing inequalities and thereby predicate its own collapse. Broader access through cooperation, investment, skills development and knowledge sharing could allow technology to play a greater role in development.
Economic and security considerations are increasingly connected. Financial systems, telecommunications networks, data centres, ports, satellites and digital public infrastructure are becoming critical national assets. Their resilience will therefore be an increasingly important component of economic as well as national security.
Infrastructure and logistics will determine whether the ambition becomes reality
Financial systems cannot operate in isolation from physical infrastructure.
Trade requires ports, roads, railways, airports, warehouses, energy networks, telecommunications, industrial zones and reliable logistics. The ability to make a payment is of limited value if a product cannot move efficiently from producer to consumer.
BRICS cooperation could therefore become increasingly relevant to infrastructure corridors, maritime connectivity, energy security, telecommunications and industrial development. The objective is not only to build more infrastructure, but to build infrastructure that connects production to markets and enables communities and enterprises to participate in regional and international value chains.
The protection of these systems as they converge the economic, technological and geopolitical dimensions of BRICS, will become equally important. Ports, energy installations, railway networks, undersea cables, satellite systems and digital payment infrastructure are all vulnerable to disruption. Economic resilience and security resilience are therefore becoming increasingly inseparable.
Security may eventually become the next frontier
A question for the future is what deeper security cooperation might look like if economic and strategic cooperation within BRICS continues to expand.
BRICS is not a NATO-style military alliance and there is no current basis for suggesting that it is becoming one. Its diversity of political systems, strategic interests and regional priorities would make such a transformation both complicated and unnecessary.
Yet security cooperation does not have to mean the creation of a collective military command or a mutual-defence obligation.
A future BRICS security agenda could conceivably develop around maritime security, counter-terrorism, organised crime, cyber protection, protection of critical infrastructure, disaster response, humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and the security of major trade and energy corridors.
The protection of an undersea cable, a major port, an energy installation, a digital payment network, a food supply chain or a strategic transport corridor can have profound national-security consequences without involving conventional warfare.
The development of artificial intelligence, robotics, drones, satellites and autonomous systems will further blur the boundaries between civilian and military technology. Cooperation in these areas could therefore encompass both defence and civilian applications, including disaster management, search and rescue, environmental monitoring, reconstruction and humanitarian operations.
This raises the possibility of a broader concept of security for development.
For developing countries in particular, security is inseparable from economic stability. A society cannot prosper if its infrastructure is constantly threatened, if its trade routes are insecure, if its digital systems are vulnerable or if conflict repeatedly destroys productive capacity.
Defence diplomacy could consequently become one of the more interesting areas for future BRICS cooperation, provided it remains anchored in sovereignty, international law, conflict prevention and the protection of civilian life.
India, BRICS and the Quad - security in a multi-aligned world
India's position becomes particularly significant when considered alongside its membership of the Quad with Australia, Japan and the United States.
At first glance, the two relationships can appear contradictory. BRICS brings India together with China and Russia, while the Quad provides a strategic framework with the United States, Japan and Australia. Through the older logic of competing geopolitical blocs, India appears to be positioned between two different camps.
But this may be precisely why India is important to understanding the emerging international order.
India's approach is better understood through the concepts of strategic autonomy and multi-alignment. New Delhi has demonstrated that it does not regard international cooperation as requiring exclusive allegiance to a single geopolitical camp. It can cooperate with one group on maritime and regional security, another on development finance, another on trade, another on technology and another on diplomacy, while maintaining its own national interests.
The Quad itself is broader than a conventional military alliance. Its cooperation extends into maritime awareness, critical and emerging technologies, connectivity, resilient supply chains, disaster response and regional stability. Its existence therefore does not necessarily contradict India's participation in BRICS; instead, it illustrates the increasingly overlapping character of international cooperation.
This could become an important feature of the future international system.
Rather than asking whether BRICS and the Quad are competing security architectures, a more productive question is whether they represent different layers of an increasingly interconnected international environment.
There are obviously areas of strategic competition and genuine differences between their members. These cannot simply be wished away. But there are also common challenges that do not recognise geopolitical boundaries: maritime safety, terrorism, cyber threats, natural disasters, pandemics, climate-related emergencies, protection of supply chains and the resilience of critical infrastructure.
The possibility therefore exists for cooperation between different security networks without requiring their institutional merger.
India could potentially be one of the country’s best positioned to encourage such practical cooperation because of its relationships across these different platforms. Its participation in BRICS, the Quad, the G20, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, BIMSTEC and IORA gives it connections across several geographical and strategic spheres.
This does not mean that India can or should mediate every disagreement between these institutions. Nor does it mean that strategic competition will disappear. Its importance lies instead in demonstrating that a country can maintain multiple relationships without accepting that every relationship must become part of a single geopolitical alignment.
For BRICS, this represents an important conceptual distinction. Strategic autonomy does not necessarily mean strategic separation. It can mean having sufficient autonomy to engage multiple centres of power while retaining the capacity for dialogue, cooperation and de-escalation.
From the security of states to the security of societies
This may be one of the more significant aspects of the broader BRICS debate.
Traditional international relations have tended to understand security primarily through states, borders and military capabilities. The emerging global environment requires a broader conception.
Food security, energy security, health security, cyber security, financial security, maritime security and environmental security are interconnected. A disruption in one system can quickly affect another.
A major cyberattack can interrupt financial transactions. A conflict can disrupt energy supplies. A blocked shipping route can increase food prices. A drought can create migration pressures. A pandemic can destabilise supply chains. A financial crisis can undermine political stability.
A comprehensive approach to security must therefore recognise these interconnections. It places military capability within a wider framework of national and human resilience.
It also opens a potential area of cooperation between military, civilian and humanitarian institutions. Defence capabilities can support disaster relief, search and rescue, reconstruction, medical response, communications and the protection of humanitarian corridors. Technology developed for defence can also have civilian applications, while civilian technological infrastructure increasingly has strategic significance. This is where the concept of defence diplomacy acquires greater relevance.
Such an approach could provide BRICS with another avenue through which security contributes to stability rather than simply reflecting confrontation.
The emerging BRICS ecosystem
Taken together, the various strands of cooperation point towards an emerging BRICS ecosystem that is considerably broader than the original concept. It encompasses political and diplomatic cooperation, development finance and the smooth connections between its components. The future of BRICS will be determined by these different elements as they begin to reinforce one another.
A new economic order does not require a new economic brick wall
There is responsibility attached to this growing influence. BRICS should resist the temptation to become simply another closed geopolitical bloc. A world divided into competing economic fortresses would not necessarily be more stable or prosperous than the system it seeks to reform. The objective should instead be diversification without isolation.
The BRICS opportunity is ultimately about entrepreneurs, investors, manufacturers, farmers, technology companies, transport operators, financial institutions, universities and ordinary consumers. The success of economic diplomacy should be visible in the expansion of opportunity.
The people must remain at the centre
International relations and diplomacy ultimately exist to create conditions in which people can live with greater security, dignity and opportunity.
This is why the New Delhi Declaration matters beyond the formal language of the summit. It reflects a BRICS that is moving beyond the symbolism of being an alternative voice and towards the more demanding responsibility of helping construct workable mechanisms for a changing world.
India's position illustrates the possibilities. Its engagement with BRICS and the Quad demonstrates that international cooperation does not necessarily have to be organised around exclusive camps. It suggests that countries can maintain different strategic relationships while looking for areas in which practical cooperation is possible.
That may prove to be one of the defining characteristics of the emerging multipolar order. A world of overlapping networks in which countries cooperate differently according to the challenge before them.
BRICS may become one important economic and political network; the Quad another; the SCO, BIMSTEC and IORA others. Their memberships may overlap, their interests may intersect and, in some areas, they may compete. Yet the possibility of dialogue between these networks could become as important as competition between them.
The central question emerging from New Delhi is whether BRICS can help reshape the existing international system?
If it can, BRICS will have moved beyond being simply an expression of a changing balance of power. It will have become one of the institutions helping to shape what comes next.